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Abstract
Standard accounts of iterated belief revision assume a static
world, about which an agent receives a sequence of observa-
tions. More recent items are assumed to have priority over
less recent items. We argue that there is no reason, given a
static world, for giving priority to more recent items. Instead
we suggest that a sequence of observations should be merged
with the agent’s beliefs. Since observations may have differ-
ing reliability, arguably the appropriate belief change opera-
tor is prioritized merging. We develop this view here, sug-
gesting postulates for prioritized merging, and examining ex-
isting merging operators with respect to these postulates. As
well, we examine other suggested postulates for iterated revi-
sion, to determine how well they ﬁt with the prioritized merg-
ing interpretation. All postulates for iterated revision that we
examine, except for Darwiche and Pearl’s controversial C2,
are consequences of our suggested postulates for prioritized
merging.
Introduction
In knowledge representation, the area of belief change ad-
dresses the speciﬁcation and construction of systems for
reasoning about a possibly uncertain and possibly evolving
world. A fundamental belief change operation is belief re-
vision (along with its dual operation of belief contraction).
Belief revision concerns the situation in which new infor-
mation may be inconsistent with the reasoner’s beliefs, and
needs to be incorporated in a consistent manner where possi-
ble. The common assumption is that in revision an agent re-
ceives information about a purely inertial (or static) world1.
information about a purely inertial (or static) world. That
is, the agent performs no actions that can cause the world to
evolve, nor do any exogenous actions occur.
A belief revision operator is not arbitrary, but rather is
usually guided by various rationality criteria. One of the
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1(Friedman & Halpern 1999) argue that more generally, what
counts in belief revision is not that the world itself is static but that
the propositions used to describe the world are static, therefore,
time-stamping variables also allows for dealing with an evolving
world in a pure belief revision setting. Thus, belief revision is also
typical of the situation where an agent investigates a past event and
tries to reason about what was the real state of the world when this
event took place.
most widely accepted of the rationality criteria is the suc-
cess postulate: that a new item of information (which we’ll
refer to as an observation) is always accepted. Thus if
we use K to denote the agent’s initial belief state, and the
agent receives the observation α, then in the revised state
K ∗ α, α is believed. Much attention has been paid to the
problem of iterated belief revision, in which an agent re-
ceives a stream or sequence of (possibly conﬂicting) obser-
vations. An assumption common to all approaches to iter-
ated revision is that revision takes place whenever an obser-
vation is received. Hence for a sequence of observations
α1, ..., αn, the result of revising by this information is
(...(K ∗α1)∗···∗αn−1)∗αn. This assumption, together
with the success postulate, implies that more recent obser-
vations are assigned a higher priority than less recently re-
ceived observations. For example, p will be believed in the
state resulting from (K ∗ ¬p) ∗ p.
This ordering of observations for revision is reasonable in
a dynamic framework, where events can occur and induce
unpredicted changes in the world. However, this does not
carry over to a purely inertial framework, where the state of
the world does not change. In this case, the order in which
the observations are made is not really signiﬁcant in itself,
and we might have received the very same observations in a
different order. Thus, for example, imagine coming home
to three messages on your telephone answering machine,
each from a friend independently reporting on a party that
you failed to attend; clearly the order of messages is irrel-
evant. In fact there are examples wherein priority is given
to the older items of information. Thus in history, all other
things being equal, older reports concerning some ancient
event may be given more weight than more recent reports,
since they are closer to the event itself and so presumably
more accurate. Even if in some contexts it makes sense that
reliability coincides with recency, these contexts are speciﬁc
and should not be considered as a general case.
In this paper we address iterated belief revision based
upon these intuitions. Thus, given an inertial framework, the
orderofobservationsisirrelevant. However, itisquitepossi-
ble that some observations may be more reliable than others
(since sources of information may have varying degrees of
reliability). Hence, for us the problem of iterated revision is,
in fact, a problem of prioritized merging of information: The
agent has (perhaps as part of an epistemic state) a set of be-liefs, and must modify its epistemic state so as to account for
the new observation. Each observation is attached an evalua-
tion of its reliability (or priority); these evaluations induce a
total preorder over the observations (and, in fact, the agent’s
beliefs), and the problem becomes one of merging this infor-
mation into a single set of beliefs while taking the priorities
into account. Thus, “standard” iterated belief revision cor-
responds to the situation in which observations are linearly
ordered, and an observation’s priority corresponds with its
temporal position.
We give a number of postulates governing prioritized
merging, and examine existing approaches with respect to
these postulates. It turns out that these postulates also imply
the AGM revision postulates. As well, we examine postu-
lates that have been proposed for iterated revision. It proves
to be the case that all postulates for iterated revision that we
examine, except for Darwiche and Pearl’s controversial C2,
are consequences of our suggested postulates for prioritized
merging.
First though, we need to address some crucial questions
about the meaning of belief revision, especially when it
comes to revising epistemic states and iteration. We fully
agree with Friedman and Halpern(1996) claim that before
stating postulates for iterated revision, the concerned prob-
lem addressed by the theory must be laid bare, namely what
they call the “underlying ontology or scenario”. This is the
topic of the next section, where we will argue that there are
(at least) three different scenarii for the revision of epistemic
states. In particular, we note that the view of iterated be-
lief revision as a merging problem adopted in this paper is
at odds with the view of belief revision as resulting from
non-monotonic inference based on background knowledge,
originally suggested by G¨ ardenfors and Makinson as a rein-
terpretation of the belief revision axioms. In the following
section, we develop a general approach for prioritized merg-
ing and investigate properties of prioritized merging as well
asitsrelationtounprioritizedmerging. Afterthis, inthenext
section we come back to iterated revision, and show that it is
essentially a speciﬁc case of prioritized merging. In the next
to last section, we brieﬂy question the assumption that the
result of merging is a plain formula, and consider the case of
merging complex observations into complex observations.
Last, we conclude with a summary and some remarks con-
cerning future research.
Revision of epistemic states: three views
Background Interest in belief revision as a foundational
topic in artiﬁcial intelligence arguably goes back to the AGM
approach (Alchourr´ on, G¨ ardenfors, & Makinson 1985),
which provides a well-known set of rationality postulates
for belief revision. This approach assumes that belief states
are modelled by sets of sentences, called belief sets, closed
under the logical consequence operator of a logic that in-
cludes classical propositional logic. An important assump-
tion is that belief revision takes place in an inertial (or static)
world, so that the input information is always with respect
to the same, static world. The axiomatic framework given
by the rationality postulates has a corresponding semantic
model, given by a so-called epistemic entrenchment rela-
tion between propositions of the language. Properties of an
epistemic entrenchment make it representable by means of
a complete plausibility ordering over possible worlds, and
the resulting belief set, after receiving input α, is viewed
as the set of propositions that are true in the most plausible
worlds where α holds. An epistemic entrenchment relation
(orplausibilityorderingonworlds)canbeviewedasanepis-
temic state, containing not just an agent’s set of beliefs, but
also sufﬁcient information for carrying out revision, given
any input. The AGM approach is silent on what happens to
an epistemic state following a revision.
Subsequent work on iterated revision has addressed this
issue. However, we suggest that the study of iterated re-
vision has led to a number of misunderstandings. Some
researchers have claimed that, once the belief set has been
revised by some input information, the epistemic entrench-
ment relation is simply lost, thus precluding the possibility
of any further iteration. Others have claimed that the epis-
temic entrenchment relation changes along with the belief
state. This has led to axioms being proposed which are in-
tended to govern the change of the plausibility ordering of
worlds; these additional axioms are viewed as extending the
AGM axioms. This approach has led to a view of belief re-
vision as a form of prioritized merging, where the priority
assignment to pieces of input is reﬂected by their recency.
I Belief revision as defeasible inference However,
this view of iterated revision seems to be at odds with
(G¨ ardenfors & Makinson 1994), which argues that belief re-
vision is the other side of non-monotonic reasoning. This
view can be characterised as belief revision as defeasible
inference (BRDI). The BRDI problem can be stated as fol-
lows: given a plausibility ordering on worlds describing
background knowledge and an input information α repre-
senting sure observations about the case at hand, ﬁnd the
most plausible worlds where α is true. It is thus assumed
that the agent possesses three kinds of information: an epis-
temic entrenchment, induced by a plausibility ordering of
worlds, a set of contingent observations about the current
world, under the form of sentences, and a set of beliefs about
the current world induced by observations and the epistemic
entrenchment (Dubois, Fargier, & Prade 2004). The role of
the latter is to guide the agent in tasks of inquiry and delib-
eration, sorting what is credible from what is less credible
in view of the contingent observations, considered as sure
facts.
Under this view, the AGM approach to belief revision (as
related to non-monotonic reasoning) has little to do with it-
erated revision as studied by subsequent researchers. Ac-
cording to G¨ ardenfors and Makinson, a revised belief set is
the result of an inference step involving (nonmonotonic or
defeasible) conditionals, from which propositional conclu-
sions are tentatively drawn. These conclusions are altered
by the arrival of new pieces of evidence, supposed to be
sure, hence consistent ((Friedman & Halpern 1996)). In this
framework, there is no clear reason why the conditional in-
formation, hence the plausibility ordering, should be reviseduponmakingnewcontingentobservations, and“iteration”in
fact corresponds to the nonmonotonic inference of new con-
clusions – that is, different inputs simply yield different non-
monotonic conclusions. The Darwiche and Pearl (1997)ax-
ioms that were intended to extend the AGM axioms so as to
allow for iterated revision by modifying the plausibility or-
dering seem to have little relevance here. Moreover, in the
AGM theory you never need the original belief set when de-
riving the revised belief set (a point also made by Friedman
and Halpern(1996)). You only need the epistemic entrench-
ment and the input information to construct the latter, while
the original belief set is based on the most plausible worlds
induced by the epistemic entrenchment.
II Belief revision as incorporation of evidence A quite
different view is to assume that an epistemic state repre-
sents uncertain evidence about a particular (static) world
of interest. An agent now gathers and “compiles” pos-
sibly uncertain or inaccurate observations about a partic-
ular world. So the underlying plausibility ordering on
worlds represents the agent’s subjective ranking as to which
world is most likely the actual world, and the degree of
entrenchment of a proposition (evaluated on the basis of
the most plausible world that violates it (G¨ ardenfors 1988;
Dubois & Prade 1991)) is an agent’s degree of belief that
a proposition is true or not. The instigating philosophical
work here arguably is (Spohn 1988), on ordinal conditional
functions, andmostworkoniteratedbeliefrevisionisplaced
within this framework. However the mathematical theory of
evidence by Shafer (1976) discusses a very similar problem
(the one of merging uncertain evidence), as well as possi-
bility theory (Dubois & Prade 1988). This overall approach
can be characterised as belief revision as incorporation of
evidence (BRIE).
Under this view, belief revision means changing the plau-
sibility ordering in response to new information, and it
makes sense to talk about iterating the process of revision.
The success postulate then expresses the fact that the most
recent information is the most reliable. However, given that
observations concern a static world, it is by no means clear
why the most recent should be taken as the most reliable. If
all observations are equally reliable, then it seems most nat-
ural to somehow merge these observations with the agent’s
beliefs. If observations come with varying degrees of reli-
ability, then it seems most natural to exploit this reliability
ordering while merging the observations with the agent’s be-
liefs.
Comparison of the ﬁrst two views To sum up the main
differences between these views: under the BRDI view, the
belief revision step leaves the epistemic entrenchment re-
lation (i.e., the plausibility ordering on states) unchanged.
This is because inputs and the plausibility ordering deal with
different matters, resp. the particular world of interest, and
the class of worlds the plausibility ordering refers to. Under
this view, AGM revision is a matter of “querying” the epis-
temic entrenchment relation; so axioms for revising the epis-
temic state (e.g.(Darwiche & Pearl 1997)), cannot be seen as
additional axioms completing the AGM axioms. In contrast,
the BRIE view understands the AGM axioms as relevant for
the revision of epistemic states including the plausibility or-
dering. Since the AGM axioms neither explicitly dealt with
ranked belief sets, they could not address iterated revision,
and additional axioms are needed to this end. Under this
view, the prior epistemic state and the inputs can be handled
in a homogeneous way, since they both consist of uncertain
evidence about the world of interest; thus, it makes sense
to have a new epistemic state be a function of the prior epis-
temic state and the input information; and it is then natural to
iterate the process. But then, the plausibility ordering does
not contain any information about how it should be revised,
while, in the BRDI view, its role is precisely to provide a
revision procedure.
III Belief revision of background knowledge There is
a third form of belief revision which we will just brieﬂy
mention: revision of background knowledge by generic
information. This problem is the one, not addressed in the
AGM theory, of revising the epistemic entrenchment rela-
tion within the BRDI view, not upon receiving a contingent
input, but upon receiving a new piece of generic knowledge.
Here, in some fashion, the generic knowledge of an agent’s
epistemic state is revised. This could also be characterised
as theory change (in the same sense as changing a scientiﬁc
theory).
Since in the BRDI view the epistemic entrenchment is
equivalently represented as a set of conditionals, this prob-
lem is also the one of revising a set of conditionals by a new
conditional (Boutilier & Goldszmidt 1993). Since the epis-
temic entrenchment is induced by a plausibility ordering on
worlds, and since an input conditional can be modeled as
another plausibility ordering, this third revision problem is
also akin to the revision of a preference relation by another
one as studied in (Freund 2004). Rules for revising a plau-
sibility ordering can be found in (Williams 1995) and (Dar-
wiche & Pearl 1997) in terms of Spohn’s ordinal conditional
functions or (Dubois & Prade 1997) in terms of possibil-
ity theory. Several authors, as for instance Friedman and
Halpern (1996), Dubois, Moral and Prade (1998) note that
the results of (Darwiche & Pearl 1997) do not make it clear
whether the considered issue is that of revising an epistemic
entrenchment ordering, or that of allowing for iteration in
the revision of belief sets.
Alternatively, one might adopt a principle of minimal
change of the background knowledge under the constraint
of accepting the new conditional. Then this is no longer a
symmetric merging process. This seems to be the rationale
behind Boutilier’s natural revision (Boutilier 1993). This
asymmetric approach has been mainly studied in the prob-
abilistic literature (Domotor 1980). For instance, Jeffrey’s
rule (Jeffrey 1965) revises probability distributions by en-
forcing a constraint P(A) = x. But there have been ex-
tensions of such probability kinematics to conditional inputs
of the form P(A | B) = x (van Fraassen 1981). Devising
basic principles and rational change operations for qualita-tive non-probabilistic representations of generic knowledge
is left for further research. In the rest of this paper the focus
is on prioritized merging of qualitative uncertain evidence.
A principled approach to prioritized merging
Prioritized merging
Prioritized merging consists of aggregating pieces of infor-
mation, all partially describing the same world and attached
with priority (reliability) levels, such that any information
at a higher level has precedence over information at a lower
level. There is nothing that says that these pieces of informa-
tion are in fact correct, or that the full set is consistent. As
suggested earlier, iterated belief revision is a speciﬁc case
of prioritized belief merging, in which priority depends di-
rectly on the time when the observations were performed,
following the priority to recency principle, which asserts
that an older piece of information is weaker than a more
recent item. While this would be perfectly acceptable in a
dynamic framework, as previously argued, it is inapplicable
in a purely inertial framework.
Moreover, there are other assumptions in the revision
literature that we might not want to take for granted. First,
we might wish to allow for more than a single piece of
information at each reliability level or, with the usual inter-
pretation of iterated revision, that a single, indecomposable
observation is gathered at each time point. Second, we
might wish to allow that a piece of information is not
automatically incorporated into the agent’s beliefs; it may,
for instance, conﬂict with these beliefs, and be less reliable
than the current beliefs.
In the following, LPS denotes a propositional language
generated from a ﬁnite set PS of propositional symbols. Let
2PS be the induced set of possible states of nature.
Deﬁnition 1 Anobservationαisdeﬁnedasaconsistentfor-
mula of LPS. A prioritized observation base (POB) is de-
ﬁned as a set of observations with an attached reliability
degree:
σ = hσ(1),...,σ(n)i, for some n ≥ 1, (1)
where each σ(i) is a (possibly empty) multiset 2 of proposi-
tional formulas, namely, the observations of reliability level
i.
The assumption that each observation is individually
consistent is in accordance with common sense; moreover
it makes the presentation simpler without inducing any
loss of generality, as our notions and results can be easily
generalized so as to allow for inconsistent observations.
Expressing a POB as a collection of multisets of formulas,
i.e., under the form σ = hσ(1),...,σ(n)i, is equivalent to
2A multiset is a set in which different occurrences of the same
object are distinguished, or more formally a mapping from LPS to
I N. σ(i) is a multiset (this assumption is usual) rather than a set
because we want, in some cases, to allow for counting occurrences
of identical observations.
expressing it as a multiset of formulas, each being attached
with a reliability degree, i.e.,
σ = {hα1,r1i,...,hαm,rmi}. (2)
We have that (2) and (1) are equivalent provided that for all
αi, αj, (a) if αi and αj are in the same σ(k) then ri = rj and
(b) if αi ∈ σ(k) and αj ∈ σ(k0) with k < k0 then ri < rj.
Given these assumptions, all notions and results in this paper
deal with ordinal scales and are thus unaffected by applying
any monotone transformation to reliability degrees.
Higher values of i indicate more reliable formulas. There
is no speciﬁc object for prior beliefs: since, according to the
discussion in the second section, under the BRIE view prior
beliefs and observations have the same status (they all bring
evidence about the actual state of the world), a prior belief
state, if any, will be represented as a prioritized formula (or
set of formulas3.
Note that reliability should not be confused with like-
lihood. The reliability of an observation reﬂects one’s
conﬁdence in the source of the observation; hence α ∧ β
may be more reliable than β if the source of the former is
more reliable than that of the latter, although it certainly
wouldn’t be more likely. The numerical counterpart of
a set of sentences σ(i) with a reliability level used here
is to be found in Shafer (1976)’s mathematical theory of
evidence. In this theory, unreliable testimony takes the
form of a proposition α and a weight m(α) reﬂecting the
probability that the source providing α is reliable. In the
theory of belief functions the reliability level ri would be
denoted m(αi) and would reﬂect the probability, for the
agent receiving αi, of knowing only αi (so the information
is considered vacuous with probability 1 − αi). There is no
constraint relating m(α ∧ β) and m(α). In this approach,
if the reliability of αi is ri it means that the (subjective)
probability of αi is at least ri. This is in full agreement
with possibilistic logic (Dubois & Prade 1991) where the
pair (αi,ri) is interpreted as the inequality N(αi) ≥ ri, and
N(αi) is a degree of necessity (certainty) or, equivalently,
entrenchment.
POBs and prioritized merging are nothing new: the
merging of POBs (elsewhere called prioritized or stratiﬁed
belief bases, prioritized defaults, or infobases) is actually
(implicitly) employed in a series of works including base
revision, prioritized default reasoning, possibilistic logic
and inconsistency handling. Arguably, up to minor differ-
ences, what these streams of work are doing is, in the end,
prioritized merging.
We use the following notation and shorthands:
• If S ⊆ LPS then
V
(S) is the conjunction of all formulas
in S, with the usual convention
V
(∅) = >. In particu-
lar,
V
σ(i) is the conjunction of all formulas in σ(i) and V
(σ) =
V
i=1,...,n
V
σ(i).
• σi→j = hσ(i),...,σ(j)i for 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n.
3We ﬁnd this view of a prior belief state as a list of input
formulas in other works, e.g. (Konieczny & Pino-P´ erez 2000;
Lehmann 1995b). We shall return to this issue later.• If σ = hσ(1),...,σ(n)i and σ0 = hσ0(1),...,σ0(p)i
then (σ,σ0) (also sometimes denoted by σ.σ0) is the con-
catenation of σ and σ0, deﬁned by (σ,σ0)(i) = σ(i) for
i ≤ n and (σ,σ0)(i) = σ0(i − n) for n + 1 ≤ i ≤ n + p.
• If σ = hσ(1),...,σ(n)i and σ0 = hσ0(1),...,σ0(n)i are
two POBs, we write σ ≈ σ0 iff for each i, we can write
σ(i) = {β1,...,βp} and σ0(i) = {β0
1,...,β0
p} such that
βj ≡ β0
j holds for every j = 1,...,p.
Similarly, we write σ0 ⊆ σ iff for every i, σ0(i) ⊆ σ(i),
where ⊆ is here multiset inclusion, and we simply say that
σ0 is a subset of σ.
• ˆ σ is the multiset
S
i=1,...,n σ(i).
• When σ(i) is a singleton {αi}, we abuse no-
tation and write (σ1→i−1,αi,σi+1→n) instead of
(σ1→i−1,{αi},σi+1→n).
• Cons(σ) is the set of consistent subsets of σ, that is, the
set of all POBs S = (S1,...,Sn) such that S ⊆ σ and V
(S) is consistent.
A prioritized merging operator ? maps any POB σ to a
propositional formula ?(σ)4.
Two speciﬁc cases of prioritized merging can be distin-
guished:
• n = 1: all pieces of information have the same reliability
degree. This is the case of non-prioritized, commutative
merging (e.g., (Konieczny & Pino P´ erez 2002)).
• σ(i) is a singleton {αi} for each i: there is a single piece
of information for each reliability level. This is precisely
the case for iterated revision, where reliability levels coin-
cide with the position of observations in the sequence, and
where a single, indecomposable observation is present at
each time point. We call such a σ a strictly ordered pri-
oritized observation base (SOPOB) and we write σ as an
ordered list σ = hα1,α2,...,αni.
Oddly enough, while each of these two speciﬁc cases has
been addressed from the axiomatic point of view in many
works, we are not aware of such a study for the general
case. Yet, some concrete prioritized merging operators have
been proposed in the literature.
In the following we use the deﬁnition: If  is a strict order
(i.e. a transitive and asymmetric binary relation) on a set X,
then for any Y ⊆ X we denote by Max(,Y ) the set of
undominated elements of Y with respect to , i.e.,
Max(,Y ) = {y ∈ Y | there is no z ∈ Y such that z  y}.
Then we have:
best-out (Benferhat et al. 1993)
4Alternatively, the outcome of a merging operator can be de-
ﬁned as a closed theory. Both are equivalent, since the set of
propositional symbols is ﬁnite; therefore any closed theory can be
described as the set of all consequences of some formula.
Let k(σ) = min{i,
V
σi→n consistent}. Then ?bo(σ) = V
σk(σ)→n. 5
discrimin (Brewka 1989; Nebel 1991; Benferhat et al.
1993)
For S,S0 ∈ Cons(σ), deﬁne S0 discrimin S iff ∃k such
that
(a) σk→n ∩ S0 ⊃ σk→n ∩ S, and
(b) for all i > k, σi→n ∩ S0 = σi→n ∩ S.
Then ?discrimin(σ) =
_n^
S, S ∈ Max(discrimin,Cons(σ))
o
leximin (Benferhat et al. 1993; Lehmann 1995a)
For S,S0 ∈ Cons(σ), deﬁne S0 leximin S iff ∃k such
that
(a) |σk→n ∩ S0| > |σk→n ∩ S| and
(b) ∀i > k, |σi→n ∩ S0| = |σi→n ∩ S|.
Then ?leximin(σ) =
_n^
S, S ∈ Max(leximin,Cons(σ))
o
When σ is a SOPOB, ?discrimin and ?leximin coincide with
linear merging6:
linear merging (Dubois & Prade 1991; Nebel 1994)
σ = hα1,...,αni is a SOPOB, and ?linear(α1,...,αn)
is deﬁned inductively by: ?linear() = > and for k ≤
n,?linear(αk,...,αn) =

αk ∧ ?linear(αk+1,...,αn) if consistent
?linear(αk+1,...,αn) otherwise
Remark: There are two different ways of deﬁning merg-
ing operators on POBs, whether the output is an epistemic
state (another ordered set of formulas) or a plain formula. If
⊗(α1,...,αn) is the epistemic state resulting from the pri-
oritizedmergingofσ = hα1,...,αnithen?(α1,...,αn) =
Bel(⊗(α1,...,αn)) is its projection (deﬁned in the usual
sense by focusing on the most normal states). One may ar-
gue against deﬁning a prioritized merging operator as pro-
ducing a plain formula: one would expect to get an epis-
temic entrenchment as the result, because it is much more
informative than the plain formula obtained by focusing on
the most plausible states. We adopt this simpliﬁed setting
here because it is sufﬁcient to unify a large part of the liter-
ature on iterated revision and commutative merging7.
5this operation is basically at work in possibilistic logic (Dubois
& Prade 1991; Dubois, Lang, & Prade 1994) where the inference
from a prioritized base σ is explicitly deﬁned as σ `Poss α if and
only if ∗bo(σ) ` α.
6actually called linear base revision in (Nebel 1994). Here we
view it as a merging operator.
7Obviously, the problem dealt with in this article is also relevant
for how to turn an ordered belief base into a ﬂat one (by extracting
its best models). This is conﬁrmed by the examples of merging op-
erations above, whose original motivation is the quest for variants
of possibilistic logic inference (Benferhat et al. 1993).Properties of prioritized merging
We now consider some desirable properties for prioritized
merging. The ﬁrst property, prioritized monotonicity, says
that a piece of information at a given level i should never
make us disbelieve something we accepted after merging
pieces of information at strictly higher levels.
(PMon) for every i < n, ?(σi→n) ` ?(σi+1→n)
This postulate reﬂects the principle of prioritization:
higher priority observations can be dealt with independently
of lower-ranked observations. It is remarkable that, as far
as we know, this postulate has never been considered within
the framework of iterated belief revision. The reason for this
might be that PMon does not compare the leftmost (what pa-
personiteratedrevisionconsiderasoldest)k observationsto
the leftmost k+1 (as do most postulates for iterated revision,
except those in (Lehmann 1995b)), but rather the rightmost
k observations to the rightmost k + 1. Note that (PMon) is
equivalent to the following:
for every i and j < i, ?(σj→n) ` ?(σi→n)
(the proof from left to right consist in applying (PMon)
iteratively to i − 1, ..., j; and from right to left, in taking
j = i − 1).
Taking i = n and j = 1 in the latter formulation, we ﬁnd
that (PMon) implies the following success property:
(Succ) ?(σ) ` ?(σ(n))
The four postulates below are classical.
(Cons) ?(σ) is consistent
(Taut) ?(σ,>) ≡ ?(σ)
(Opt) if
V
(σ) is consistent then ?(σ) ≡
V
(σ)
(IS) if σ ≈ σ0 then ?(σ) ≡ ?(σ0)
Even if uncontroversial, some of these postulates deserve
some comments. First, consistency may not be a relevant
concern in an enlarged setting where prioritized merging
produces a prioritized set of formulas. (Thus consider, by
analogy, the debate around the renormalization step in the
Dempster rule of combination (Shafer 1976) with belief
functions, where renormalizing the result comes down to a
consistency preservation assumption). However, since we
adopt an approach that produces a single formula, it is natu-
ral to require the consistency of this formula. (Taut) is rea-
sonable given our assumption that every formula in a POB is
(individually) consistent. (Opt) is closure by optimism: ob-
servations are all accepted if they are jointly consistent. The
last postulate actually means that we could do away with
the propositional language and directly work with sets of
possible worlds (for instance simple support belief functions
(Shafer 1976), or possibility distributions (Dubois & Prade
1988), or systems of spheres (Grove 1988) ). We keep the
logical setting because it adheres more closely with common
practice, and readers may be more familiar with it. Lastly,
the above postulates seem to be general enough to be ap-
propriate for other kinds of merging problems, for instance
merging a set of more or less important goals in the scope of
decision making.
Proposition 1 (PMon) and (Opt) imply generalized suc-
cess:
(GS) if, for a given value of i,
V
σi→n is consistent then
?(σ) `
V
σi→n.
Proof: Assume
V
σi→n is consistent. Then by (Opt),
?(σi→n) =
V
σi→n. Now, by (PMon), ?(σ) ` ?(σi→n),
therefore ?(σ) `
V
σi→n. 
It seems that (GS) has also never been considered in the
literature on iterated revision. Again, the reason might be
that (GS) focuses on the rightmost k observations. We be-
lieve that generalized success is very natural, and fully in
the spirit of prioritization and iterated revision. In the latter
context it reads: if the most recent k observations are jointly
consistent then accept them all.
Corollary 1 If ? satisﬁes (PMon) and (Opt) then
?(σ) ` ?bo(σ)
Proof: Just take i = k∗(σ) = min{j,
V
(σj→n) is consis-
tent} in (GS). 
Thus, any ? satisfying (PMon) and (Opt) is at least as
strong as best-out merging.
(PMon), (Cons), (Taut), (IS) and (Opt) seem uncontrover-
sial and will be called basic properties for prioritized merg-
ing operators. We now consider additional properties. The
ﬁrst we consider is right associativity; after an extended ex-
ploration of the ramiﬁcations of right associativity, we con-
sider a second property that gives sufﬁcient expressivity to
imply the AGM belief revision postulates.
(RA) ?(σi→n) = ?(σ(i),?(σi+1→n))
The idea here is that prioritized merging can be carried out
on a given reliability level independently of lower levels.
Unlike the basic properties, right associativity, although nat-
ural and intuitive, is not totally unquestionable, as we may
well imagine prioritized merging operators which are not
right associative. Note that (RA) and (Succ) imply (PMon).
From ﬂat merging to prioritized merging
(RA), together with the above properties, leads us to the fol-
lowing construction: since ?(σ) can be computed incremen-
tally by merging σ(n) and then by incorporating σ(n − 1)
and so on to the result, we can induce a prioritized merging
operator from a non-prioritized – or basic – merging opera-
tor, andviceversa. Letusdeﬁnea(constrained)ﬂatmerging
operator × as a mapping from a multiset of formulas Φ and a
consistent formula θ to a closed theory ×(Φ|θ) (the merging
of Φ under integrity constraint θ, similarly as in (Konieczny
& Pino P´ erez 2002)) such that:
(Cons×) ×(Φ|θ) is consistent
(Succ×) ×(Φ|θ) ` θ
(Opt×) if
V
(Φ)∧θ is consistent then ×(Φ|θ) ≡
V
(Φ)∧θ
(IS×) if Φ ≈ Φ0 and θ ≡ θ0 then ×(Φ|θ) ≡ ×(Φ0|θ0)
These properties are called respectively (IC1), (IC0),
(IC2) and (IC3) in (Konieczny & Pino P´ erez 2002). Addi-
tional properties could be considered; they would, of course,induce additional properties of prioritized merging; here, for
the sake of brevity we stick to these four basic, undebat-
able properties of merging (besides, the aim of our paper
is not to ﬁnd an exhaustive list of properties for prioritized
merging, but rather to show how it relates to, and general-
izes, ﬂat merging and iterated revision.) Moreover, this way
of inducing prioritized merging operators from ﬂat merging
operators gives us a way of lifting representation theorems
of Konieczny and Pino-P´ erez (2002) from ﬂat to prioritized
merging (again, this issue is not central to our paper).
Proposition 2 ?satisﬁes(Cons), (IS),(PMon), (Opt), (Taut)
and (RA) if and only if there exists a constrained ﬂat merging
operator × such that
1. ?(σ(n)) = ×(σ(n)|>);
2. for each i < n, ?(σi→n) = ×(σ(i)| ? (σi+1→n)).
We denote by H the mapping × 7→ ? deﬁned above, that is,
? = H(×).
Proof:
(⇐) Let ? be deﬁned from a ﬂat merging operator × by the
above construction, that is, ? = H(×).
1. ? satisﬁes (Cons) because × satisﬁes (Cons×).
2. ? satisﬁes (PMon) because ?(σi→n) = ×(σ(i)| ?
(σi+1→n))and, dueto(Succ×), ×(σ(i)|?(σi+1→n)) `
?(σi+1→n).
3. We show by induction that ? satisﬁes (Opt). Assume V
(σ) consistent. Then for all i,
V
(σi→n) is consis-
tent. In particular,
V
(σ(n)) is consistent and then
?(σ(n)) = ×(σ(n)|>) =
V
σ(n) by (Opt×). As-
sume that for some i, ?(σi+1→n) =
V
(σi+1→n).
Then ?(σi→n) = ×(σ(i)|
V
(σi+1→n)), and since V
(σ(i)) ∧
V
(σi+1→n) =
V
(σi→n) is consistent, we
have ?(σi→n) =
V
(σi→n). Hence by backward induc-
tion we get ?(σ) =
V
(σ), therefore ? satisﬁes (Opt).
4. ?(σ(i),?(σi+1→n)) = ×(σ(i)| ? (?(σi+1→n))); but
?(σi+1→n) is a consistent formula (since it has been
proven at point 1 above that (Cons) holds), there-
fore, by (Opt) (which has been shown to hold as
well, at point 3 above), ?(?(σi+1→n)) ≡ ?(σi+1→n).
Thus, ?(σ(i),?(σi+1→n)) = ×(σ(i)| ? (σi+1→n)) =
?(σi→n), which shows that (RA) holds.
5. We show (Taut) by induction. ?(σ(n),>) = ×(σ(n)|?
(>)) = ×(σ(n)|>) using (Opt); thus, ?(σ(n),>) =
?(σ(n)). Now, assume ?(σi+1→n,>) = ?(σi+1→n).
Then ?(σi→n,>) = ×(σ(i)| ? (σi+1→n,>)) =
×(σ(i)|?(σi+1→n) = ?(σi→n). Therefore, ?(σ,>) =
?(σ).
6. We show (IS) by induction. Let σ ≈ σ0. ?(σ(n)) =
×(σ(n)|>) ≡ ×(σ0(n)|>) using (IS×), therefore
?(σ(n)) ≡ ?(σ0(n)). Assume that ?(σi+1→n) ≡
?(σ0
i+1→n). Then ?(σi→n) = ×(σ(i)| ? (σi+1→n)) ≡
×(σ0(i)|?(σ0
i+1→n)) using (IS×) together with σ(i) ≈
σ0(i) and ?(σi+1→n) ≡ ?(σ0
i+1→n). Therefore,
?(σi→n) ≡ ?(σ0
i→n).
(⇒) Let ? be a prioritized merging operator satisfying
(Cons), (IS), (PMon), (Opt), (Taut) and (RA). Deﬁne
× = G(?) by ×(Φ|θ) = ?(Φ,{θ}).
It is easily checked that × satisﬁes (Cons×), (Succ×) and
(Opt×).
It remains to be checked that H(G(?) = ?. Let
× = G(?)) and ?0 = H(G(?)). Then ?0(σ(n)) =
×(σ(n)|>) = ?(σ(n),>) = ?(σ(n)) by (Taut). Sup-
pose that ?0(σi+1→n) = ?(σi+1→n). Then ?0(σi→n) =
×(σ(i)| ?0 (σi+1→n)) = ×(σ(i)| ? (σi+1→n)) (using the
induction hypothesis ?0(σi+1→n) = ?(σi+1→n)); now,
×(σ(i)| ? (σi+1→n)) = ?(σ(i),?(σi+1→n)) = ?(σi→n);
hence, ?0(σi→n) = ?(σi→n) for all i, which proves that
?0 = ?.
Therefore, there exists a constrained ﬂat merging operator
×(= G(?)) such that ? = H(×).

Proposition 2 gives us a practical way of deﬁning prior-
itized merging operators, namely by inducing them from
any ﬂat constrained merging operator. A ﬁrst question is
whether the well-known prioritized merging operators re-
viewed above can be built up this way, or, equivalently,
whether they satisfy the above properties or not. This turns
out to be the case for ?discrimin and ?leximin, and a fortiori
for ?linear. We ﬁrst deﬁne the constrained ﬂat merging op-
erators ×i and ×c and then we show that they respectively
induce ?discrimin and ?leximin.
Deﬁnition 2 For any multiset Φ of propositional formulas,
and any propositional formula θ,:
• a θ-consistent subset of Φ is a subset X of Φ such that V
(X) ∧ θ is consistent; C(Φ,θ) denotes the set of all
θ-consistent subsets of Φ;
• X ⊆ Φ is a maximally θ-consistent subset of Φ if and
only if X ∈ C(Φ,θ) and there is no X0 ∈ C(Φ,θ) such
that X ⊂ X0; MaxCons(Φ,θ) denotes the set of all
maximally θ-consistent subsets of Φ;
• X ⊆ Φ is a maxcard θ-consistent subset of Φ if and only
if X ∈ C(Φ,θ) and there is no X0 ∈ C(Φ,θ) such that
|X| < |X0|; MaxcardCons(Φ,θ) denotes the set of all
maxcard θ-consistent subsets of Φ.
Deﬁnition 3
• ×i(Φ|θ) =
W
{(
V
X) ∧ θ | X ∈ MaxCons(Φ,θ)}
• ×c(Φ|θ) =
W
{(
V
X) ∧ θ | X ∈ MaxcardCons(Φ,θ)}
We easily verify that ×i and ×c are constrained ﬂat
merging operators, that is, they satisfy (Cons×), (Succ×),
(Opt×) and (IS×).
Now, we have the following result:
Proposition 3
1. H(×i) = ?discrimin
2. H(×c) = ?leximin
Before proving Proposition 3 we ﬁrst state the following
Lemma (the proof of which is omitted).
Lemma 1 If S ⊆ ˆ σ then we write S = (S1,...,Sn), where
Sj = S ∩ σ(j), and we also write Sj→n = (Sj,...,Sn).1. for all j ≤ n,
Sj→n ∈ Max(discrimin,σj→n) ⇔ 
Sj ∈ MaxCons(σ(j),?discrimin(σj+1→n))
Sj+1→n ∈ Max(discrimin,σj+1→n)
2. for all j ≤ n,
Sj→n ∈ Max(leximin,σj→n) ⇔ 
Sj ∈ MaxcardCons(σ(j),?leximin(σj+1→n))
Sj+1→n ∈ Max(leximin,σj+1→n)
Proof of Proposition 3: We give the proof for (1) in full
detail; the proof for 2 is very similar. The result is shown
by backward induction. Let ?i = H(×i) and Hyp(j) the
induction hypothesis
Hyp(j) : ?discrimin(σj→n) = ?iσj→n)
Hyp(n) is easily veriﬁed: ?discrimin(σn→n) =
?discrimin(σ(n)) =
W
(
V
S|S ∈ MaxCons(σ(n)) =
×i(σ(n)|>) = ?i(σn→n).
We now show that Hyp(j + 1) implies Hyp(j). Assume
Hyp(j + 1) holds. We have ?discrimin(σj→n) = W
{
V
(S)|S ∈ Max(discrimin,Cons(σj→n)}.
Now, using Lemma 1, S ∈ Max(discrimin
,Cons(σj→n)) holds iff S = (Sj,Sj+1→n)
where Sj ∈ MaxCons(σ(j),?discrimin(σj+1→n))
and Sj+1→n ∈ Max(discrimin,σj+1→n).
Therefore, ?discrimin(σj→n) =
W
(
V
S|S ∈
MaxCons(σ(i),?discrimin(σj+1→n)) =
×i(σ(j)| ?discrimin (σj+1→n)). Thus, Hyp(j) is sat-
isﬁed. 
Therefore, we recover ?discrimin and ?leximin as the pri-
oritized generalizations of maxcons and maxcard merging
(which is what we expected). As a corollary, ?discrimin
and ?leximin satisfy (Cons), (IS), (Taut), (PMon), (Opt) and
(RA).
There is no reason to stop here: we can take other
ﬂat merging operators and see what happens when we
“prioritize” them. For instance, if we take the degenerate
merging operator ×deg(Φ|θ) =
V
Φ ∧ θ if consistent,
×deg(Φ|θ) = θ otherwise, then the induced priori-
tized merging corresponds to linear merging, where
each σ(i) is considered as a single indivisible formula V
σ(i). We can also take for × a distance-based merg-
ing operator as in (Konieczny, Lang, & Marquis 2004;
Delgrande & Schaub 2004), a quota-based one as in
(Everaere, Konieczny, & Marquis 2005), etc. It should
be noticed that we cannot recover ?bo this way, be-
cause it fails to satisfy (RA) (even though it satisﬁes
all other properties): take for example the SOPOB
σ = hb,¬a,ai. Then ?bo(σ) = a. Now, ?bo(σ2→3) = a and
?bo(b,?bo(σ2→3)) = ?bo(hb,ai) = (a ∧ b).
Lastly, we may also consider the following property:
(Add)
If ?(σ) ∧ φ 6` ⊥
then ?(σ1→n−1,σ(n) ∪ {φ}) ≡ ?(σ) ∧ φ
Thus, informally, if a formula is consistent with a merg-
ing operation, then the conjunction of that formula with the
merging is the same as doing the merging with the formula
added to the highest priority level. Interestingly, if we re-
strict this postulate to 2-level SOPOBs (that is, SOPOBs of
the form hα1,α2i) we recover the AGM postulates (using
the reformulation of (Katsuno & Mendelzon 1991)):
Proposition 4 Let?beaprioritizedmergingoperatorsatis-
fying the basic postulates for prioritized merging operators,
and let ∗ be deﬁned by
α ∗ β = ?(α,β)
Then
1. ∗ satisﬁes the AGM postulates (R1), (R2), (R3) and (R4);
2. if ? satisﬁes (Add) then ∗ satisﬁes (R5) and (R6).
Therefore, the basic postulates together with (Add) im-
ply the full set of AGM revision postulates. Note that (Add)
is satisﬁed by most intuitive merging operators, including
?discrimin, ?leximin (a fortiori ?linear) and ?bo. Further,
(Add) implies (Opt).
Back to iterated revision
Recall that the speciﬁc case of iterated revision is obtained
by specializing prioritized merging to SOPOBs; we may
then ask what the axiomatic studies for belief revision be-
come in our framework. In the following we therefore con-
sider prioritized merging operators ? restricted to SOPOBs.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume furthermore that each
individual observation is consistent.
Various researchers have studied a number of postulates
that, apart from (C2), are generally considered desirable:
(C1) if β ` µ then ?(σ.µ.β) = ?(σ.β);
(C2) if β ` ¬µ then ?(σ.µ.β) = ?(σ.β);
(C3) if ?(σ.β) ` µ then ?(σ.µ.β) ` µ;
(C4) if ?(σ.β)∧µ is consistent then ?(σ.µ.β)∧µ is consis-
tent;
(Rec) if β ∧ µ is consistent then ?(σ.µ.β) ` µ;
(Ind) if ?(σ.β) ∧ µ is consistent then ?(σ.µ.β) ` µ.
(C1) - (C4) come from (Darwiche & Pearl 1997), (Rec) from
(Nayak et al. 1996; Nayak, Pagnucco, & Peppas 2003), and
(Ind) from (Jin & Thielscher 2005). (C2) has been criti-
cized in several places, including (Freund & Lehmann 1994;
Nayak et al. 1996; Konieczny & Pino P´ erez 2002); see (Jin
& Thielscher 2005) for a recent discussion.) It is shown
in (Jin & Thielscher 2005) that (C3) and (C4) follow from
(Ind).
Interestingly enough, all of these postulates, except the
controversial (C2), are consequences of our properties (and
even of our basic properties, except for (C1)).
Proposition 5
• (Opt) and (RA) imply (C1);
• (PMon), (Opt) and (Cons) imply (Rec), (Ind) and a for-
tiori (C3) and (C4).
Proof:(Opt) and (RA) imply (C1) Let β and µ be consistent (re-
call that we consider only consistent inputs) such that
β ` µ. Then β ∧ µ is consistent (since it is equivalent
to β). By (Opt) we have ?(µ,β) = β. By (RA) we get
?(σ.µ.β) = ?(σ,?(µ.β)) = ?(σ.β).
(PMon) and (Opt) imply (Rec) Assume β ∧ µ consistent.
By (GS), ?(σ.µ.β) ` µ ∧ β.
(PMon) and (Opt) imply (Ind) Assume ?(σ.β)∧µ consis-
tent. By (Succ), ?(σ.β) ` β, therefore β ∧ µ is consis-
tent. Then by (GS) we have ?(σ.µ.β) ` β ∧ µ, therefore
?(σ.µ.β) ` µ.

This means (C1), (C3), (C4), (Rec), and (Ind) are here given
a new justiﬁcation (and a new interpretation) in the more
general context of prioritized merging. Actually, (C3), (C4),
(Rec) and (Ind) are all consequences of the following:
If µ ∧ β is consistent then ?(σ.µ.β) ≡ ?(σ.µ ∧ β) and
?(σ.µ.β) ` µ ∧ β.
This property reminds us that in the AGM frame-
work, we have that if µ and β are inputs consistent
with each other then Postulates 7 and 8 collapse into
(σ ∗ µ) ∗ β = σ ∗ (µ ∧ β). There is also a property of
probabilistic conditioning, whereby conditioning P(σ | µ)
on β is equivalent to computing P(σ | µ ∧ β), when µ ∧ β
is consistent.
We might then wonder about the addition of the postulate
(C2). Reinterpreted in the context of prioritized merging,
(C2) means that when we have two contradicting observa-
tions, the less reliable one is totally overridden by the more
reliable one. Hence, observations are considered as atomic,
and are undecomposable: if one wants to reject a part of the
observation then we have to reject it all, so that, for example,
when merging a∧b together with the more reliable observa-
tion ¬b, we get ¬b and we ignore the support on a given by
theweakerobservation. Notethatifwemergeσ(1) = {a,b}
withσ(2) = {¬b}usingdiscrimin, weget{a,¬b}, whilewe
get {¬b} if σ(1) = {a∧b}. The point is that in postulates of
iterated revision (C1-4), revision is made by a formula, not
by a multiset of formulas. Rewriting (C2) for multi-sets in
the form
if σ(3) ` ¬∧σ(2) then ?(σ(1),σ(2),σ(3)) = ?(σ(1),σ(3))
clearly highlights the debatable nature of this axiom.
In the case of SOPOBs, we get an interesting result:
adding(C2)tothepreviouspostulatesrestrictsthesetofpos-
sible prioritized merging operators to a single one, namely,
linear merging.
Proposition 6 Assume σ is a SOPOB and ? satisﬁes (Opt),
(PMon), (RA), (Cons) and (C2). Then ?(σ) = ?linear(σ).
Proof: By induction we show that ?(σi→n) =
?linear(σi→n), denoted (A(i)). A(n) is obviously true.
Suppose A(i + 1) holds. Then ?(σi→n) = ?(σ(i),
?(σi+1→n)) by (RA), thus ?(σi→n) = ?(σ(i),
?linear(σi+1→n)) by A(i + 1). Now, two cases:
• if σ(i) ∧ ?linear(σi+1→n)) is consistent then by
(Opt), ?(σi→n) = σ(i) ∧ ?linear(σi+1→n)), therefore
?(σi→n) = ?linear(σi→n));
• if σ(i) ∧ ?linear(σi+1→n)) is inconsistent then by
(C2), ?(σi→n) = ?(?linear(σi+1→n)); by (Cons),
?linear(σi+1→n) is consistent, therefore, by (Opt),
?(?linear(σi+1→n)) = ?linear(σi+1→n); therefore
?(σi→n) == ?linear(σi+1→n) = ?linear(σi→n)).

If (C2) is not required, other operators for SOPOBs are
possible. ¿From Proposition 2, we know that a prioritized
merging operator satisfying (Opt), (PMon), (RA), (Taut)
and (Cons) is deﬁned from a ﬂat merging operator. Here,
when restricting POBs to SOPOBs, a constrained ﬂat merg-
ing operator × for SOPOBs maps any pair of consistent
formulas ϕ and θ to a formula ×(ϕ|θ), satisfying
1. ×(ϕ|θ) is consistent;
2. ×(ϕ|θ) ` θ;
3. if ϕ ∧ θ is consistent then ×(ϕ|θ) ≡ ϕ ∧ θ.
× can be seen as a “pre-revision” operator. Take for
instance ×Hamm(ϕ,θ), where Mod(×Hamm(ϕ,θ)) is de-
ﬁned as the models of θ minimizing the Hamming distance
to Mod(ϕ). Then the associated prioritized merging opera-
tor ?Hamm for SOPOBs satisﬁes (RA) and the basic proper-
ties, but not (C2): for instance, we have
?Hamm(a ∧ b,¬a) = ¬a ∧ b 6≡ ?Hamm(¬a)
Complex observations
Prioritized observation bases consist of very speciﬁc pieces
of information: a propositional formula, together with a reli-
ability level, that partitions the set of states into two subsets
(states that are accepted and states that are rejected by the
piece of information). More generally, we may want to al-
low pieces of information expressing that some states are
more plausible than others, and thus allow for more than
a simple dichotomy. Thus, for example, (Nayak 1994) ad-
dresses belief revision where the formula for revision comes
with its own system of spheres; similarly, (Meyer 2001)
looks at speciﬁc ways in which plausibility orderings may
be combined; see also (Chopra, Ghose, & Meyer 2003).
Thus, complex observations can be identiﬁed with epistemic
states, and merging them comes down to merging epistemic
states. Note that merging complex observations is more gen-
eral than prioritized merging, which itself is more general
than iterated revision.
We just give an example of a model handling complex ob-
servations, using kappa functions (see also (Williams 1995;
Jin & Thielscher 2005) for iterated revision operators in this
framework). A kappa function κ (Spohn 1988) is a mapping
from S to I N such that mins∈S κ(s) = 0 (the higher κ(s), the
less plausible s.) A complex observation is here any kappa
function κobs. The combination of two kappa functions κ1
and κ2 is deﬁned (only when mins∈S κ1(s) + κ2(s) < ∞)
by (κ1 ⊕κ2)(s) = κ1(s)+κ2(s)−mins∈S κ1(s)+κ2(s).⊕ is associative, therefore we can deﬁne the merging of
n observations ⊕(κ1,...,κn). Deﬁne a simple observa-
tion κϕ,k, where ϕ is a consistent formula and k ∈ I N, by
κϕ,k(s) = k if s |= ϕ, κϕ,k(s) = ∞ if s |= ¬ϕ. (Note
that the restriction to simple observations implies a loss of
generality (Laverny & Lang 2005).) Prioritized merging, in
this framework, is obtained by considering only simple ob-
servations and taking sufﬁciently high values of k in κϕ,k so
that (PMon) holds. Then, in this speciﬁc case, the prioritized
merging operator obtained is ?leximin, and specialization to
SOPOBs gives ?linear.
The above example could be reformulated likewise in
the setting of (numerical) possibility theory. A possibility
distribution π can be obtained by rescaling a kappa func-
tion inside the unit interval, namely (Dubois & Prade 1991)
πκ(s) = 2−κ(s). Then the most plausible states are when
πκ(s) = 1, and the impossible states when πκ(s) = 0. An
epistemic entrenchment is the ordering of formulas induced
bynecessitydegreesN(α) = 1−maxs|=¬α πκ(s). Asimple
observation is just a weighted formula in possibilistic logic.
The view of the AGM setting proposed in (Dubois & Prade
1992) is precisely that of prioritized merging of a complex
observation (an epistemic entrenchment) with a high prior-
ity simple observation in order to ensure the success pos-
tulate. In possibility theory, the above associative rule on
kappa functions reads (π1 ⊕ π2)(s) =
π1(s)·π2(s)
maxs∈S π1(s)·π2(s).
This merging operation was proposed by Dubois and Prade
(1988) as generalizing the associative merging operation in
the old MYCIN expert system. It is also very close to Demp-
ster rule of combination of belief functions after Shafer
(1976) (it only uses a different normalization factor).
These remarks indicate that enlarging the present frame-
work of prioritized merging to complex observations has po-
tential for bridging the gap between logical and numerical
approaches to merging uncertain information.
Concluding remarks
The traditional account of iterated revision assumes that an
agent receives information about a static world, in the form
of a sequence of formulas that are incorporated into her be-
liefsetaccordingtotheprincipleofrecency. Wehaveargued
that iterated revision should instead be treated more gener-
ally, as prioritized belief merging; thus an agent receives in-
formation about a static world, where the information (or
perhaps the sources of information) come with varying de-
grees of reliability. This information is then incorporated
with the agent’s belief set, taking reliability into account.
What is usually called iterated belief revision turns out to be
a restriction of this more general setting.
We began by surveying approaches to prioritized merg-
ing, and provided a set of postulates, with respect to which
existing approaches to merging were examined; as well it
was shown how the full postulate set implies the AGM re-
vision postulate set; further (given right associativity) it was
shown that prioritized merging is expressible as sequential
“ﬂat”merging with integrity constraints. Given this frame-
work, we re-examined postulates for iterated revision that
have been previously proposed. Lastly, we brieﬂy consid-
ered complex observations.
Our focus then has been on examining the relation be-
tween prioritised merging and iterated revision; to this end
we presented a minimal set of merging postulates that were
adequate for this purpose. What remains then for future
work is to carry out a systematic examination of prioritized
merging, along the lines of what (Konieczny & Pino P´ erez
2002) do for ﬂat merging. This presumably would entail
presenting a general and, in some sense complete, set of pos-
tulates for prioritised merging. It is not difﬁcult to come up
with reasonable extended variants of the basic postulates.
For example, the following extended version of (Opt) seems
uncontentious:
if
^
(σ) is consistent then ? (σ0.σ) ≡ ?(σ0,∧(σ)).
As well, (Taut) would seem to generalize readily to:
?(σ0.>.σ) ≡ ?(σ0.σ).
On the other hand, not all ﬂat merging operators readily gen-
eralize to prioritized counterparts; for example, a prioritized
counterpart to a majority merging operator, characterized by
the postulate:
∃k such that ? (σ1→i−1,σi ∪ {α}k,σi+1→n) ` α
is incompatible with (PMon). Hence, a general approach to
prioritized merging may not be a straightforward extrapola-
tion from unprioritized counterparts.
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